What Does Germany's Election Crisis Mean for World?

It doesn’t take an expert to know that an unstable Germany has not been historically great for the world

We have to be careful when discussing ‘German instability’ or a ‘German democratic crisis’ - it immediately conjures images of a dark past not so long ago. Complicating mature analysis, one of the most useful comparisons to the current moment is found in Germany’s 1928 elections, the last vote in Weimar to produce a functioning coalition before the country’s descent into fascism.

What Just Happened?

12 hours after Trump was declared winner of the US presidential election, Germany’s governing coalition collapsed. Chancellor Scholz announced he had dismissed his Finance Minister, Christian Lindner. Lindner is of a different political party, the Free Democratic Party, FDP, while Chancellor Scholz is of the Social Democratic Party, SPD. After elections in 2021, Scholz’s Social Democrats, Lindner’s Free Democrats, and a third party, the Greens, joined in an uncomfortable alliance to form a majority in Germany’s Parliament, the Bundestag. And thus, to govern Germany.

The coalition ended when Chancellor Scholz fired Lindner, who left and took other Free Democratic Party cabinet members with him. Without the Free Democrats in coalition, Chancellor Scholz could no longer rely on FDP votes to wield a majority in the Bundestag. Therefore, Germany is having elections on February 23rd, 2025, even though an election was not originally scheduled until September 2025.

Why did they break up?

Hopes were set on this three-party coalition. The three participants (SPD, FDP, Greens) had large ideological differences, making joint governance difficult. The Social Democrats and Greens are of the left, while the Free Democrats are of the right. However, all involved felt pressure to make it work on behalf of a stable, democratic Germany. After all, the 2021 elections were the first of the post-Merkel era. Angela had governed for 16 years prior, becoming not only a leader for Germany, but for Europe. If these three parties could find a way to form a functioning coalition, it would be a big signal that Germany could fly without ‘Mutti’ (Mama) Merkel.

They lived up to expectation at the start, signing a coalition agreement on December 7th, 2021. But once they entered office, the crises started piling up. Russia invaded Ukraine three months later, shocking Germans awake from their timid approach to defense. Chancellor Scholz called for a ‘Zeitenwende’ (sea-change) that would see Germany spend more on defense and become Ukraine’s largest supporter in Europe.

But energy prices soared, Germany’s economy stalled, and national budgets became tight. The three coalition members hadn’t sacrificed their other governing priorities: transitioning to a climate-friendly energy economy (Greens), expanding the social state (SPD), digitalizing services and reducing bureaucracy (FDP). However, as the reality of inflation and war sunk in, these goals became increasingly harder to achieve.

In November 2023, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court deemed a critical part of a government budget illegal. The budget had been an attempt to fund some of the coalition partner’s priorities. So when the Court’s intervened to kill the government’s budgeting tricks, it also initiated the slow death of the government coalition.

With most of its biggest priorities unachievable, the three parties in government spent the next year infighting. Their disagreements often leaked out into the media. The general feeling was that an ‘undignified’ coalition would break before scheduled elections in September 2025.

And that feeling was correct. On November 6th, 2024, Germans awoke to the news of a second Trump presidency. That evening, Chancellor Scholz had a long debate with his Finance Minister, Christian Lindner. After, he called a press conference and fired the man, who he said had betrayed agreements, trust, and staged ideological fights for the media. It was a personal attack.

Why is this a problem?

The first formal three-party coalition in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany was only necessary because the vote was splintered in 2021. Scholz’s SPD got the most votes, 25.7%, but this was a low total for a winner. For comparison, in various elections since 2005, Merkel’s CDU never dipped below 30%. All parties of the ‘demokoratische Mitte’ (democratic middle) in Germany suffered in 2021.

A large part of the reason for this splintering in German voting behavior is a dissatisfaction with traditional parties. This is a self-perpetuating cycle, because when the vote is split, forming coalitions becomes more difficult - good governing becomes more difficult - more people become dissatisfied… new elections, more splintering — you get the idea.

The collapse of Scholz’s three-party government has only increased general dissatisfaction. The beneficiaries might be other traditional parties who did not participate in the three-party coalition. The other beneficiaries are likely to be be populist extremes.

One of them is the Alternative for Germany, AfD, a right-wing nationalist party. The AfD became popular for its opposition to Merkel’s refugee policies. Today, the anti-asylum message has expanded to be generally anti-migrant. The AfD are critical of the European Union and NATO. They’ve been labeled by Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as extremist. All traditional parties have vowed to never work with them in government.

The AfD’s 18-20% support in polling as of writing would translate to their best election results ever. The remaining 80% of the votes in Germany would go to other parties, and the general splintering of the electorate would continue.

Therefore, it’s possible another multi-party coalition will be necessary after February 2025 elections. As we’ve just learned, multi-parties are difficult to hold together. Thus, the AfD can say, “look, democratic parties are ineffective. Vote for us instead.” The cycle could continue.

This ‘doom cycle’ of splintered votes is on the mind of Germans concerned for their democracy. Several parties of the left and right share interest in defending Germany’s Constitution, Grundgesetz and democratic norms in the face of threats from extremes. The surge of populism makes such more difficult.

What does all this mean for the world?

An economically strong, democratically stable Germany at the heart of the European Union is a reality most take for granted. A slowing German economy with government uncertainty poses risks for the upcoming years.

First, Germany will be less prepared for a second Trump Administration.

Trump’s inauguration will be January 20th. Germany’s elections not are taking place until February 23rd, after which weeks of coalition haggling could take place. A stable government might not arrive until Spring. That’s a big time gap, an eternity in geopolitics.

That means a cohesive response to expected Trump tariffs will be hard to achieve. In addition, nimble adjusting to the new Administration’s policy on Ukraine could be complicated. Third, if Trump threatens to leave NATO or the Paris Climate Agreement, Germany will be with only a rudderless caretaker government.

Second, Germany will be unable to collaborate properly with European partners

Germany won’t be alone in Europe as the new Trump Administration takes shape. An old friend, Emmanuel Macron, still holds France’s presidency, albeit with a weakened authority after 2024 legislative elections. The UK, though outside the EU, has a friendlier face in Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Even less amenable EU partners, like Italy’s Prime Minister Meloni, seem ready to work with Germany on continent-wide immigration and defense issues.

Naturally, none of this will be easy without predictable governance in Germany. These neighbors may be able to wait until Spring, but if a unified response is needed for any emergency, it won’t be as easily forthcoming. Europeans may call the Kanzleramt in Berlin and get a busy tone.

Third, Germany’s role in the Indo-Pacific will be called into question

Imagine a scenario in which the incoming Trump Administration says something like, “Look, Germany, let’s cut a deal. I’ll go easy on tariffs against you and the EU if you join me in hiking tariffs on our shared rival, China.” Trump is likely more vindictive than this, but such a scenario isn’t impossible to imagine.

How would Germany respond to such coercion? In general, Germany has been slower to awaken to the challenges posed by China, but recent action (well, abstention) on Chinese electrical vehicle tariffs, and recent German Naval patrols in the South China Sea show a recognition that naively ignoring China is no longer an option.

Let’s repeat: without a stable government in Berlin, maneuvering in such circumstances would be a mess.

Fourth, it’s another knock on the post-war international order.

I recently posted on this publication and on YouTube about the history and geopolitics of Antarctica. Part of my analysis was that post-war international order was breaking down. Institutions like the UN, created with sincere intent to keep the peace after World War II, had long been exposed as feckless. The ‘great power’ diplomacy of the 19th century, as Elizabeth Buchanan put it in Foreign Affairs, was making a comeback.

Trump’s reelection is another sign that such geopolitics have returned. Regional hegemonies breaking down, multiple poles of global influence, large personalities bouncing around international summits: this is the future we can expect for at least the next four years.

And the timing for Germany could not be worse. Just as the rest of the world is consolidating around their ‘Great Men’ to participate in a global reshuffle on trade, Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific, the Germans are dipping into a dicey election season. The result of those elections are just as likely to be inconclusive muddling as they are to be decisive and stabilizing.

Good luck, Germany! Alles Gute.

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I just uploaded an analysis of the context and history behind Germany’s election crisis to YouTube. Check it out, if you’d like: